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MacDonald (2013) presents a strong case
for speech production having a pivotal
role in the cognition of language pro-
cessing. Experimental research has been
strongly biased toward the study of lan-
guage comprehension, and it is an intellec-
tual pleasure to be invited to rethink the
consequences of the constraints imposed
by speech production on both the form
of utterances and how utterances are pro-
duced and understood.
Yet, it seems to us that production and
comprehension are much more in bal-
ance. For instance, when Latin lost many
of its inflectional exponents and morphed
into what is now modern French, the
pronouns of Latin, which were used for
emphasis only, became obligatory. This,
it would seem, serves the listener rather
than making life easier for the speaker. In
the convection cycle of language change
over time, speakers time and again opt
for articulatory simpler forms whenever
they can. In French, this led to reduced
forms (compared to Latin) of the sub-
ject and object pronouns. In modern col-
loquial French, these pronouns can even
become prefixoids that are fusing into the
verb, leading to structures such as Jean il
l’a vue Pierre. The result is an inflectional
system with subject and object marking on
the verb, remarkably similar to the forms
of Amerindian languages (Vendryes, 1921;
Lambrecht, 1981). Simplification by the
speaker is followed by diversification for
the listener, which is followed by simpli-
fication by the speaker. Crucially, in the
negotiation of communication, utterances
only have a chance of being replicated (in
the evolutionary sense) if they are both
producible and understandable (cf. Steels,
1998; Steels and Wellens, 2006).
However, rather than attempting
to evaluate MacDonald’s program by
means of individual case studies, in this
commentary we take a step back, and
argue for a view in which the forces of pro-
duction and comprehension are not only
much more balanced, but in which they
are essentially the same. To understand
why we think the similarities are much
more important than the differences, we
turn to learning theory and information
theory.
AsMacDonald emphasizes, learning is a
ubiquitous aspect of experience. Although,
it is often conceptualized abstractly as
a process that increases knowledge (like
adding entries to an encyclopedia) and
that improves performance (by increas-
ing counters in the head, whether con-
ceptualized as Bayesian priors or by serial
search in a frequency ordered encyclo-
pedia), it is important to note that the
mechanistic picture of learning that has
emerged from many lines of inquiry in
the cognitive and brain sciences is discrim-
inative. At both low- (e.g., O’Brien and
Raymond, 2012) and high- (e.g., Ramscar
et al., 2013b) levels of abstraction, learn-
ing is a process that reapportions atten-
tional/representational resources in order
to maximize future predictive success
(e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Pearce
and Hall, 1980; Sutton and Barto, 1998;
McLaren and Mackintosh, 2000; Schultz
and Dickinson, 2000; Kruschke, 2001;
Danks, 2003). Prediction error is used
to discriminate against uninformative cues
and to reinforce informative cues. These
models of learning belong to a broad class
of discriminative algorithms, along with
the overwhelming majority of biologically
based learning models (Schultz, 2006).
An important, though little-mentioned
feature of this kind of learning is that it
yields an inherently lossy form of coding
(Ramscar et al., 2010). If languages are
learned discriminatively, the representa-
tions of relationships between form and
meaning that learners acquire from expe-
rience will be subject to constant change,
and these changes will involve information
loss. Learned relationships between forms
and meanings will be subject to constant
variation, both across different language
users, and within language users over time
(Ramscar et al., 2013d). As MacDonald
rightly observes, in these circumstances, all
linguistic communication can be expected
to involve ambiguity.
A crucial consequence of lossy coding is
that linguistic forms do not simply serve as
hash codes for mapping form onto mean-
ing. The forms of language are simply not
rich enough data structures to formally
encode the full richness of the experiences
they serve to communicate (Ramscar et al.,
2010). It is therefore not at all clear what
it means to say, as MacDonald does, that
“linguistic utterances clearly differ from
other actions in that they have both a
goal (e.g., to communicate) and a mean-
ing.” Given what we understand about
learning and encoding (see Grünwald and
Vitányi, 2003 for an introduction to cod-
ing theory), it is clear that utterances nei-
ther encrypt their meanings, nor do they
map onto them in a compositional, or
even determinate, way. In spite of the
pervasiveness of the structural metaphor
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) that language
is like a conveyor belt transporting boxes
with meanings from speaker to listener,
and that it is desirable to optimally stack
the boxes so that their load is uniformly
distributed over the conveyor belt (Hale,
2006; Levy, 2008; Jaeger, 2010; see Ferrer-
i-Cancho and Moscoso del Prado Martín,
2011; Pellegrino et al., 2011 for critiques)
there is good reason to believe that mean-
ing is not in the words nor in the sentences.
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This is where Shannon (1948)’s mathe-
matical theory of communication provides
insight:
“The fundamental problem of commu-
nication is that of reproducing at one
point either exactly or approximately
a message selected at another point.
Frequently the messages have meaning;
that is they refer to or are correlated
according to some system with certain
physical or conceptual entities. These
semantic aspects of communication are
irrelevant to the engineering problem. The
significant aspect is that the actual mes-
sage is one selected from a set of possible
messages. The system must be designed
to operate for each possible selection,
not just the one which will actually be
chosen since this is unknown at the time
of design.” (Our emphasis.)
In other words, whatever the experiences
and goals we wish to communicate might
be, a signal should not be assumed to be
a compositional deconstruction of them.
Instead, an encoding simply needs to
enable senders and receivers to discrim-
inate between experiences and goals on
the basis of a shared code. For example, in
a world with just two experiences (being
hungry; being satiated) and no noise, a
code with just two non-decompositional
signals, 0 and 1, suffices.
The relationship between signals and
meanings in this kind of system can be
summarized as follows (MacKay, 2003):
1. A communication system requires a
sender and a receiver to be in posses-
sion of a source code defining the scope
of the possible messages that can be
transmitted.
2. Communication across the system is
not concerned with the meaning of
messages. In a Shannon system the
receiver reconstructs the source message
from the received signal by discrimi-
nating the source message from other
possible messages that might have been
selected and noise introduced by the
communication channel.
3. The receiver does not interpret or
expand on the source message. It sim-
ply reconstructs it at the destination
with no loss of signal content. In lin-
guistic terms, necessary condition for
successful communication is that a
listener be able to correctly identify the
form of the message sent. To the extent
that a speaker and listener’s codes con-
verge, this will serve to reduce, or even
eliminate, a listener’s uncertainty about
the experiences and goals that led a
speaker to select that message, align-
ing the listener’s predictions with the
speaker’s intentions.
Although, this picture is very different
to most historical approaches to language
(Frege, 1892; Russell, 1905; Wittgenstein,
1947; Miller, 1951; Chomsky, 1957, 1997;
Tomasello, 2005), there are many reasons
to believe that Shannon’s theory provides
a fruitful framework for the understanding
of human communication.
First, as we noted above, learning is
a process that leads to the acquisition of
exactly the kind of predictive, discrimina-
tive codes that information theory spec-
ifies for artificial systems (Hentschel and
Barlow, 1991; Atick, 1992). The critical
difference between human and artificial
communication systems is that human
communicators learn as they go. Indeed,
an alternative description of the goal of
utterances is that speakers intend lis-
teners to learn something from them.
Virtually all utterances—even, “Hello!”—
are intended to reduce a listener’s uncer-
tainty, whether about the world, or the
thoughts, feelings etc., of a speaker; learn-
ing is largely defined in terms of this kind
of uncertainty reduction (Rescorla, 1988;
Hentschel and Barlow, 1991; Ramscar
et al., 2013b).
Second, since learning is a discrim-
inative process, acquiring a language
amounts to learning how forms discrim-
inate between the rich experiences and
goals that speakers and listeners share (see
Baayen et al., 2011, for a proof of con-
cept). From this perspective, MacDonald’s
suggestion that prediction serves to “guide
comprehension,”—somehow helping rich
semantic understandings to be mysteri-
ously extracted from a few sparse sig-
nals (Ramscar, 2010)—is unnecessarily
vague and complicated when compared
to a more straightforward view of com-
prehension as the reduction of listeners’
uncertainty about speakers’ intentions as
messages unfold (Ramscar et al., 2010;
see also Pickering and Garrod, 2007;
McMurray and Jongman, 2011).
Third, not only does learning appear to
extract a particular kind of predictive code
(Schultz and Dickinson, 2000), but the
distributional structures of languages cor-
respond closely to optimal predictive codes
(Hentschel and Barlow, 1991). In Shannon
entropy terms, the least efficient possible
code has a uniform distribution (i.e., one
in which all alternatives are equiprobable
at any given choice point) and the most
efficient code is one in which items are
distributed in the most non-uniform way
possible (i.e., a power law distribution).
The distributions of languages approxi-
mate the latter at every level so far exam-
ined (Zipf, 1949; Genzel and Charniak,
2002, 2003; Aylett and Turk, 2004, 2006;
Manin, 2006; Futrell and Ramscar, 2011;
Ramscar and Futrell, 2011; Piantadosi
et al., 2011).
Finally, it is clear that the nature
of learning changes across childhood
(Ramscar and Gitcho, 2007; Thompson-
Schill et al., 2009; Ramscar et al., 2013c).
Very young children are deficient in many
prefrontal functions that, as MacDonald
emphasizes, are important to speech plan-
ning. This is a curious adaptation, but
it offers at least one benefit: if “sim-
ple” discriminative learners are exposed
to a highly structured environmental
stimulus—a language and its experiential
correlates—and are restricted to sampling
it in the same, non-deliberative way, they
will learn very similar systems of mappings
(Ramscar et al., 2013a; see also Shannon,
1956).
In other words, learning, and its devel-
opmental trajectory across childhood, are
particularly well-adapted for the acquisi-
tion of common predictive codes (in the
Shannon sense), and linguistic distribu-
tions appear to have evolved—socially—to
optimize these codes for communication
(in the Shannon sense). It is within this
information-theoretic rethinking of lan-
guage that the question of the relative
importance of comprehension and pro-
duction in shaping language comes to
stand in a different light.
We immediately acknowledge that lin-
guistic distributions must be optimized for
speech production (see also Zipf, 1949).
However, we contend that this optimiza-
tion is totally constrained by what the lis-
tener can tolerate. For instance, in spoken
Dutch, the word eigenlijk (actually) can
Frontiers in Psychology | Language Sciences May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 233 | 2
Ramscar and Baayen Production, comprehension, and synthesis
reduce to egk. However, the speaker can-
not opt for articulatory laziness in total
disregard of the listener. Native speakers
of Dutch do not understand egk when
spoken in isolation (Ernestus et al., 2002;
Kemps et al., 2004), and successful com-
prehension critically depends on its use in
appropriate contexts. In other words, egk
is a functional element of the speech sig-
nal by the grace of being part of a code that
speakers and listeners share. Thanks to this
shared code, what is easy for the speaker to
produce is easy for the listener to under-
stand. Likewise, what is more difficult for
the speaker to encode, at whatever level
of linguistic structure, is more difficult for
the listener to decode. These considera-
tions lead to the prediction that for each
of the interesting examples discussed by
MacDonald where we currently see opti-
mization for production at work, there is
a corresponding benefit for comprehen-
sion. If, as we suspect, Shannon’s view of
communication is correct, these benefits
must be there, even if it is difficult to dis-
cern them at present, given our still very
limited understanding of the experiences,
and their neuro-cognitive instantiations,
that we share when communicating with
language.
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